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COMMENTS
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana -Certification
According to accepted banking practice, one desiring to lend
added security to a transaction involving payment by check may
have the check certified by the bank on which it is drawn and
thus insure its ready acceptability. Certification is an act where-
by a drawee bank obligates itself to pay a check according to its
terms." This is usually accomplished by the bank's stamping
across the face of an instrument drawn on itself the word "certi-
fied" or "accepted" followed by the name of the bank and signed
by an authorized bank officer or employee.2 From this process
a number of legal problems have arisen. It is the purpose of this
Comment to discuss first, the development of the law of certifi-
cation in Louisiana; second, its treatment under the NIL ;3 and
third, the possible effects which the adoption of the proposed
Uniform Commercial Code 4 would have on the matter.
Certification in Louisiana
The development of the law of certification in Louisiana did
not parallel exactly that of the common law states. It was many
years after the practice of certification was established in com-
mon. law jurisdictions that the first case on the subject arose in
Louisiana. 5 The language of that case, however, indicates that
certification was by no means a new practice in this state. There-
after, in cases involving certification, Louisiana courts did not
hesitate to consult and apply the law of other jurisdictions,
1. 1 PAToN, DIGEST 797 (1940).
2. Ibid. For a discussion concerning authority to certify, see id. at 799 et seq.,
817 et seq., and Annot., 1 A.L.R. 693, 710 (1919). Generally, any wording leading
to reliance on the statement of the officer will be sufficient to constitute certifica-
tion. 1 PATON, DIGEST 826 et 8eq. (1940). The wording "through the New Or-
leans Clearing House, indorsement guaranteed," however, does not constitute cer-
tification. See M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 2
La. App. 118 (1925), affirmed, 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925), apparently over-
ruling Mutual National Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. Ann. 933 (1876), 'which had held
that similar words constituted certification.
3. LA. R.S. 7:187-188 and related sections (1950).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAnrr, TEXT AND COMMENTS
EDITION (1952). Changes in the Official Draft which have been adopted since
1952 are indicated where applicable.
5. Louisiana State Bank v. Hibernia Bank and Germania National Bank, 26
La. Ann. 399 (1874).
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unless specific Civil Code provisions required a different result.6
This was especially evident in cases involving forgery or altera-
tion of checks. Early Louisiana cases recognized that the drawee
is bound to know the drawer's signature and cannot charge his
account if his signature was forged or unauthorized, in the ab-
sence of the drawer's negligence. 7 The Civil Code, however, ex-
pressly recognized the right to recover the money paid through
mistake or error.8 But this rule was qualified to the extent that
recovery would be denied if there were reliance on the acceptance
or certification leading to the purchase of the instrument or if,
once paid, the drawee delayed in seeking recovery and the one
who received payment changed his position in reliance on the
delay.9 Thus, despite common law decisions to the contrary,
Louisiana courts permitted the drawee bank to recover money
paid on a check on which the drawer's signature was forged
where it was not shown that the check was purchased in reliance
on the acceptance.' 0 But where reliance could be shown, the
courts were quick to deny recovery." Again, contrary to the ma-
6. Unfortunately, they did so frequently with little knowledge of their mean-
ing. See Louisiana National Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189, 190, 26 Am.
Rep. 92, 94 (1876), where the court cited Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 1357, 97
Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), for the proposition that "one of two innocent persons
must suffer in this case; it would seem but just that he whose act has caused the
loss should bear it." The court went on to refuse a drawee the right to recover
money paid on a fraudulently raised check, a situation to which the doctrine of
Price v. Neal has never been extended. See Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3
Const. 230 (N.Y. 1850), and cases cited in BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 140, no.
1 (1943).
7. Etting v. The Commercial Bank, 7 Rob. 459 (La. 1844) ; Laborde v. The
Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana, 4 Rob. 190, 39 Am. Dec.
517 (La. 1843).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2301 et seq. (1870) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 18
(1870). This same principle was recognized in the Civil Code of 1825. See LA.
CIviL CODE art. 2279 et seq. (1825). See also Butler v. J. B. Murison & Co., 18
La. Ann. 363 (1866) ; Citizens' Bank v. Dugue and Louisiana State Bank, 5 La.
Ann. 12 (1850) ; Oakey v. Bank of Louisiana, 17 La. 386 (1841), all decided at
the same time that the principle was being formulated that there must be actual
reliance to deny recovery. For a discussion of this subject, see Notes, 15 TUL. L.
REV. 468 (1941), 23 TUL. L. REV. 174 (1948).
9. McKleroy & Bradford v. Southern Bank of Kentucky, 14 La. Ann. 458, 74
Am. Dec. 438 (1859) ; McCall v. Corning, 3 La. Ann. 409 (1848). Although these
two cases did not involve certification, they established the principle that there
must be reliance on the acceptance or a change in the position of the payee for
recovery to be denied. See Howard & Preston v. The Mississippi Valley Bank, 28
La. Ann. 727 (1876), applying this principle to deny recovery. This principle was
applied in cases involving certification. See also Louisiana National Bank v. Citi-
zens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189, 26 Am. Rep. 82 (1876) ; Louisiana State Bank v.
Hibernia Bank and Germania National Bank, 26 La. Ann. 399 (1874).
10. Louisiana National Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189, 26 Am. Rep.
92 (1876) ; Louisiana State Bank v. Hibernia Bank and Germania National Bank,
26 La. Ann. 399 (1874) ; McKleroy v. Southern Bank of Kentucky, 14 La. Ann.
458, 74 Am. Dec. 438 (1859) ; McCall v. Corning, 3 La. Ann. 409 (1848).
11. Howard & Preston v. The Mississippi Valley Bank, 28 La. Ann. 727
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jority common law rule, the Louisiana courts refused to permit
the drawee bank to recover money paid on a check that had been
raised prior to certification or acceptance where it was estab-
lished that the check had been negotiated in reliance on the
bank's approval of the check. 12
The adoption of the NIL in Louisiana in 190413 ended these
differences and brought Louisiana into accord with the majority
of the common law jurisdictions. In speaking of the effect to
be given to the NIL when in conflict with prior law, a Louisiana
court in one case said: "[W] e are dealing with one of the several
uniform laws adopted by our State and it is desirable that the
construction given such laws be uniform."' 4 The court held that
payment of a check on which the signature of the payee had been
forged did not constitute an acceptance, thereby refuting the
principles on which the earlier cases had been decided. 15 In 1940,
the court recognized the doctrine of Price v. Neal by rejecting
prior jurisprudence that allowed recovery by a drawee from a
(1876). It has been stated that this case constituted a recognition of the doctrine
of Price v. Neal in Louisiana. See BaITToN, BILLS AND NOTES § 133, no. 5 (1943).
It is submitted, however, that although the cases reached the same conclusion,
they did so on different grounds. For a discussion of the doctrine see Ames, The
Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HAav. L. REv. 297 (1890) ; Comment, The Effect of
the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on the Negotiable In-
struments Law of Louisiana - The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 16 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 128 (1955).
12. Louisiana National Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189, 26 Am.
Rep. 92 (1876). For cases not involving certification, see Commercial Press,
Smith & Goldsmith v. Crescent City National Bank, 26 La. Ann. 744 (1874)
F. J. Vanbibber & Co. v. The Bank of Louisiana, 14 La. Ann. 481 (1859).
13. La. Acts 1904, No. 64, p. 147, now LA. R.S. 7:1 et seq. (1950).
14. M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 2 La. App.
118, 120-21 (1925), affirmed, 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925).
15. The Feitel case has been consistently followed. Joffrion-Woods, Inc. v.
Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 19 La. App. 419, 139 So. 22 (1932) ; Spremich v.
Somerfield, 166 So. 630 (La. App. 1936) ; Lawrence J. Kern, Inc. v. Panos, 177
So. 432 (La. App. 1937); Strudwick Funeral Home, Inc. v. Liberty Industrial
Life Ins. Co., 176 So. 679 (La. App. 1937) ; Blanchard v. Bank of Morgan City
& Trust Co., 185 So. 120 (La. App. 1938). The Feitel case is important in another
respect. Prior to the adoption of the NIL the Louisiana court had found privity
of contract between the holder of a check and the drawee bank, despite common
law decisions denying such right on the basis that a chose in action is not as-
signable. See Gordon & Gomila v. Muchler, 34 La. Ann. 604 (1882), overruling
Case v. Henderson, 23 La. Ann. 49, 8 Am. Rep. 590 (1871), which had accepted
the common law rule. See also State ex rel. St. Amand v. Bank of Commerce, 49
La. Ann. 1060, 22 So. 207 (1897) ; F. J. Vanbibber & Co. v. The Bank of Lou-
isiana, 14 La. Ann. 481 (1859) ; McKleroy & Bradford v. Southern Bank of
Kentucky, 14 La. Ann. 458 (1859), requiring notice to the bank that the check
was drawn before permitting suit. These rulings are in accord with civilian prin-
ciples. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2642 et seq. (1870). The Feitel case, however,
held that adoption of NIL § 189 overruled this line of cases and established the
common law rule, thus requiring acceptance or certification in Louisiana. But
see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1324, § 189 (7th ed., Beutel,
1948), where the Feitel case is criticized as wrong.
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holder in due course on a check that the former had certified and
which contained a forgery of the drawer's signature.16
The Louisiana courts have not been called upon to rule on
questions of certification very frequently; and, as a result, many
points remain to be determined. Since the courts have indicated
that they will apply the uniform law, the decisions reached in
other states are of great importance. A change in those rules
should be of considerable significance in Louisiana. The follow-
ing section will present the most important of the present rules
of certification with an indication of the areas of conflict. The
remainder of the discussion will be devoted to a determination
of the possible effect an adoption of the proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code would have on those rules.
Certification Under the NIL - In General
There are only two provisions of the NIL which deal specif-
ically with the subject of certification.17 Those provisions are
as follows:
NIL section 187: "Where a check is certified by the bank
on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to an
acceptance."
NIL section 188: "Where the holder of a check procures
it to be accepted or certified the drawer and all indorsers are
discharged from liability thereon."
The two cited provisions of the NIL incorporate only the basic
rudiments of the law of certification and do not express all of
the law on the subject. Principles established prior to the adop-
tion of the NIL remain effective unless in conflict with the statu-
tory law.18 The remainder of the law of certification has been
16. Security Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 199 So. 472 (La.
App. 1940), 15 TUL. L. REV. 468 (1941). As a general rule, it may be said that
the rule that money paid in error can be recovered now obtains in Louisiana,
with the exception of the doctrine of Price v. Neal. See Comment, The Effect of
the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law of Louisiana - The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 16 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 128 (1955) ; Turner v. Tri-State Airmotive Co., 33 So.2d 707 (La. App.
1948), 23 TUL. L. REV. 174 (1948), permitting the person whose account has been
charged with a forged check to elect whether to sue the payee or the bank.
17. For an excellent discussion of the development of the certified check, see
Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450 (1935).
For background discussion and an analysis of early leading cases, see Tompkins,
The Certification of Checks, 50 Am. L. REG. (O.S.) 127 (1902).
18. LA. R.S. 7:195 (1950) : "In any case not provided for in this Chapter the
rules of the law merchant shall govern." See corresponding NIL § 196.
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developed through judicial interpretation of related provisions
of the NIL. This approach has resulted in many varied interpre-
tations of those provisions and the uniformity intended to be
obtained by the adoption of the NIL has not been attained. 19
As a general rule, banks will not certify bearer checks, un-
dated checks, checks endorsed without recourse, previously dis-
honored checks, and checks which the drawer has instructed
should not be certified.20 Federal and state law prohibit bank
officials from certifying checks against insufficient funds. 21 To
be effective, certification must be in writing, but this writing
may be on a separate instrument. 22 Thus, certification can be
accomplished through a telegraphed instrument.2 3  Where a
check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, this certifi-
cation is equivalent to an acceptance.2 4 By this procedure the
bank becomes primarily liable to the holder of the instrument.25
19. For a discussion of difficulties encountered in early interpretations of the
NIL, see Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARe. L. REv. 241 (1900) ;
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law- A Word More, 14 HAEv. L. REV. 442
(1901) ; Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law- Necessary Amendments, 16
HARe. L. REV. 255 (1902) ; Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law- A Re-
joinder to Dean Ames, 15 HARe. L. REV. 26 (1901). The cited articles relate to
what has become known as "the Ames-Brewster controversy," which has been
discussed by McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (A Review of the
Ames-Brewster Controversy), 50 AM. L. REG.(O.S.) 437, 499, 561 (1902). See
also Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 25 (1928) ;
Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 1047 (1929).
20. 1 PATON, DIGEST 814 et seq. (1940). The primary reason given is that it
is against good banking practice, although it would also cause loss of good will in
certain instances. See Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should Know About . . .
Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168, 172 (1954). Dahlin gives us another reason for banks
refusing to certify checks payable to "cash" or "bearer" a federal administrative
announcement to the effect that such certification created fiat money in violation
of the law, which announcement, although not binding, may still be remembered.
21. See 62 STAT. 749, 18 U.S.C. § 1004 (1948). For the Louisiana statute,
see LA. R.S. 6:15 (1950) : "No officer or employee of any state bank, savings
bank, or trust company shall certify any checks, drafts, or order drawn on the
bank or trust company unless the person drawing the check, draft, or order has
on deposit with the bank or trust company at the time of certification an amount
of money equal to at least the amount specified in the check, draft, or order."
22. NIL §§ 132-135.
23. Ibid. See Commercial Bank v. First National Bank, 147 La. 925, 86 So.
342 (1920), cited in Annot., 13 A.L.R. 986, 989 (1921). See also Annots., 26
A.L.R. 312 (1923), 2 A.L.R. 1146 (1919) ; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 187 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 180 (1943) ; 1
PATON, DIGEST 826, 828 (1940).
24. NIL § 187.
25. NIL §§ 62, 192. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 187
(7th ed., Beutel, 1948), citing Downey v. Citizens State Bank, 100 Ind. App.
158, 194 N.E. 743 (1945) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 180 (1943) ; 1 PATON,
DIGEST 797 (1940); STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER
139-40 (2d ed. 1954). A cashier's check, on the contrary, is received in payment
and not as an added obligation. See Nelson v. Christian Reformed Church, 290
Ill. App. 260, 8 N.E.2d 385 (1937) ; Berg v. Federal Reserve Bank, 55 N.D. 406,
213 N.W. 963 (1927).
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There is, however, no assignment of funds; nor is any special
preference to the funds created by the certification in favor of
the holder.26 The amount of the check, however, is deducted from
the drawer's account and is then transferred to the "certified
check" account on the general books of the bank.2 7 Although the
funds assigned to meet payment of the certified checks generally
are not considered to be deposit liability, a certified check is
within the protection afforded by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.28 It is a general rule that the drawer of a check
merely contracts that it will be paid on presentment, not that it
will be certified. The drawee bank is under no obligation to cer-
tify a check and a refusal to do so does not dishonor the instru-
ment.29 Certification obtained by a stranger or by one unauthor-
ized to do so has no effect as regards the parties to the instru-
ment.80
26. NIL § 189. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 187 (7th
ed., Beutel, 1948) ; see also Lloyd v. The Butler County State Bank, 122 Kan.
835, 253 Pac. 906 (1927) ; Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1030, 1034 (1927) ; STEFFEN, CASES
ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 139-40 (2d ed. 1954). But note that for
bankruptcy and insolvency statutes, the certification date has been held to be the
date of transfer. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1015, 1020 (1949).
27. 1 PATON, DIGEST 797 (1940). The point has been raised that the bank
has no voucher in its possession upon certification to justify its charge to the
drawer's account. The use of photostats has been recommended as a partial solu-
tion to this problem in case of loss or alteration. See Steffen & Starr, A Blue
Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 459, n. 56 (1935).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 330.1 (1949). See Breckenridge, The Banking Act of 1935,
22 A.B.A.J. 93, 95 (1936), as cited in STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT PAPER 140 (2d ed. 1954). This was not true under early state
guaranty statutes. See Butts, State Regulation of Banking by Guaranty of Do-
posits, 2 MIss. L.J. 208 (1930).
29. Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928) ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.
374 (1929) ; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 187 (7th ed., Beutel,
1948) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 180 (1943) ; 1 PATON, DIGEST 814 et seq.
(1940).
30. 1 PATON, DIGEST 819 et seq. (1940); see Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan,
274 U.S. 473, 57 A.L.R. 921, 925 (1927) ; State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, 295 Ill. 599, 129 N.E. 498, 12 A.L.R. 989, 992 (1920) ; Whiting v.
Hudson Trust Co., 234 N.Y. 394, 138 N.E. 33, 25 A.L.R. 1470, 1480 (1923);
Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code
on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana - The Impostor Rule, 16 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW 115 (1955). For the proposition that a collecting bank has no
authority to accept anything but cash, see Wessell Plumbing Co. v. Scriber &
Curtis, 134 So. 336 (La. App. 1931) ; Lake Charles Feed Co. v. Sabatier, 14 La.
App. 233, 125 So. 318 (1929), affirmed on rehearing, 14 La. App. 233, 235, 129
So. 261 (1930). This was seriously questioned, however, in Bain v. Worsham,
159 So. 463, 465 (La. App. 1935), where the court found the drawee bank to be
the agent of the payee in collecting from the drawer and denied the payee the
right to recover from the drawer where the drawee failed to remit the funds after
charging the drawer's account. For the proposition that the crediting of the de-
positor's account is payment of a check drawn on the bank of deposit, see Sowers
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 6 La. App. 721 (1927) ; Schutte v. Citizens Bank, 3 La.
App. 547 (1926). One accepting a certiifed check runs risk of nonpayment. See
Annot., 61 A.L.R. 739, 748 (1929). In Louisiana, tender of a check is not pay-
ment. See Sadler v. May Bros., Inc., 185 So. 81 (La. App. 1938) ; Shushan
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Certification differs from acceptance in at least two respects.
In the acceptance of a bill of exchange other than a check the
drawer's account is not charged.3 ' Further, and more important,
in the acceptance of a demand bill of exchange other than a
check, the drawer and the endorsers are not discharged, but re-
main secondarily liable on the instrument.32 This latter rule also
applies to an acceptance or certification of a check at the request
of the drawer.83 But where acceptance or certification of a
check is procured at the request of the holder, the drawer and
all endorsers are discharged.3 4 In such an instance, certification
has been deemed the equivalent of payment.3 5 Other courts have
held that certification is a new contract substituted for that of
the drawer.3 6 This confusion has led a few courts to conclude
that certification is not an acceptance but a thing sui generis."7
Bros. & Co. v. Hinson, 154 So. 648 (La. App. 1934); W. K. Neckwear Co. V.
Rabinowitz, 133 So. 450 (La. App. 1931). As regards tender of a certified check,
where the holder procures certification the drawer is discharged. Where the
drawer procures certification it has been held that the payee must object to pay-
ment being made in this form for it not to constitute final payment. See Annots.,
87 A.L.R. 442, 444 (1933), 52 A.L.R. 994, 1001 (1928) ; Karvalsky v. Becker,
217 Ind. 524, 29 N.E.2d 560 (1940), for the proposition that mere receipt of
the check without agreement that it shall be treated as payment does not con-
stitute payment. The fact that a check is certified will not take it out of the
operation of the doctrine that a tender by check is not ordinarily payment.
See Annots., 131 A.L.R. 1074 (1941) ; 23 A.L.R. 1284, 1286 (1923) ; Thompson
v. Crains, 294 Ill. 270, 128 N.E. 508 (1920), for proposition that objection to a
tender that it was not sufficient waives objections that it was by certified check
instead of cash; Annots., 51 A.L.R. 393, 395 (1927) ; 12 A.L.R. 931 (1921).
For Louisiana cases holding an accord and satisfaction to have taken place upon
certification, see Fuss v. Cordeleria de San Juan, S.A., 224 La. 338, 69 So.2d
365 (1953) ; Berger v. Quintero, 170 La. 37, 127 So. 356 (1930). But cf. Conner
v. Harper, 197 La. 677, 2 So.2d 177 (1941), cited in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term - Bills and Notes, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 202-03 (1942) ; Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 203 La. 316,
14 So.2d 10 (1943).
31. Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should Know About .. .Checks, 43 ILL. B.J.
168, 171-72 (1954).
32. NIL § 61.
33. Brown v. Leckie, 43 Ill. 497 (1867) ; Bickford v. First National Bank,
42 Ill. 238 (1866) ; Rounds v. Smith, 42 Ill. 245 (1866) are the cases which
established this principle. See discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for
the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 467 et seq. (1935).
34. First National Bank v. Leach, 52 N.Y. 350 (1873) is recognized as the
primary case for this principle. See Jones, The Liability of the Maker of a Check
After Certification, 6 HARV. L. REV. 138 (1892) ; Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print
for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 468 et seq. (1935) ; Tompkins, The
Certification of Checks, 50 AM. L. REG. (O.S.) 127 (1902).
35. Smith v. Miller, 43 N.Y. 171, 176 (1870) ; Essex County Nat. Bank v.
Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193 (C.C. 1876), as cited in Steffen & Starr, A Blue
Print for Certified Checks, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 469, n. 103 (1935).
36. Boyd v. Nasmith, 17 Ont. 40, 41 (1889), as cited in Steffen & Starr, A
Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 469, n. 104 (1935).
37. Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N.E. 489 (1892) is the initial authority
for this proposition.
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There is dispute concerning the length of time the drawer
remains secondarily liable where he procures the certification.88
Some cases seem to indicate that he continues to be liable in-
definitely as a guarantor of the bank's liability. 9 Under the
NIL, however, a check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time ;40 but the drawer remains liable except to the
extent that he has suffered loss by the delay.41 There is also a
question whether the holder is entitled to bring the drawer's
action for the amount of the loss. 42 In addition, there is conflict
concerning the time when the statute of limitations begins to
run. Some courts hold that it begins to run at the time of cer-
tification. 43 The majority rule, however, is that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the check is presented for
payment.44 The theory underlying this conclusion is that a certi-
fied check is not due until presented for payment.45
Under an extension of the doctrine of Price v. Nea146 the
drawee bank is liable to the holder if it certifies a check on which
the signature of the drawer has been forged. It will not be per-
mitted to charge the drawer's account, nor may it recover from
a holder in due course any sum paid. But the drawee bank is not
liable to the forger, the thief, or one not a holder in due course.
47
38. See discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check,
13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 470 et seq. (1935), and authorities cited therein.
39. Ibid., referring to criticism of the case of Born v. Bank of Indianapolis,
123 Ind. 78, 28 N.E. 689 (1889).
40. NIL § 186. According to Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94
(1933), this means promptly or the drawer is completely discharged.
41. NIL § 186. See Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check,
13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 471, n. 113 (1935), to the effect that there are two delay
periods, one under NIL § 186 and the other under NIL § 71.
42. Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV.
450, 471 (1935) ; STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 149
(2d ed. 1954).
43. 1 PATON, DIGEST 843 (1940).
44. Ibid. A certified check is compared to a certificate of deposit concerning
which the same dispute exists. See Dean v. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank &
Trust Co., 227 Iowa 1239, 290 N.W. 664 (1940) ; Annot., 128 A.L.R. 137, 157
(1940) ; Keleher v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 145 Misc. 589, 260 N.Y. Supp.
899 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1932). For liability of the bank, see Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1138
(1926), where it is stated that the cases uniformly hold that mere delay in pre-
senting a certified or accepted check to a drawee bank for payment does not, un-
less by operation of the statute of limitations, release the bank from liability
thereon.
45. See Dean v. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank & Trust Co., 227 Iowa 1239,
290 N.W. 664, 128 A.L.R. 137, 157 (1940).
46. See note 11 supra.
47. I PATON, DIGEST 804 et seq. (1940). See especially Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929), where it was said:
"The rule established by the NIL that a bank honoring a forged check cannot re-
cover back the amount paid out, deals with the rights and liabilities of those who
are legitimate parties to the instrument and does not prohibit the bank from re-
COMMENTS
In the absence of negligence the certifying bank may refuse pay-
ment of checks which are altered after certification and may re-
cover any amount paid on the altered instrument. 48 But there is
some conflict concerning the liability of the drawee bank that
certifies a check on which the name of the payee has been
changed or the amount of the check has been raised.4 9 Gen-
erally, the rule obtains that money paid in error may be recov-
ered.50 The Illinois and California courts, however, have held
the drawee bank liable when it certified a check on which the
payee's name had been changed,"' on the theory that the drawee
bank is liable on its certification according to the tenor of the
check at the time of certification.52 In the majority of jurisdic-
tions, on the other hand, the drawee bank is held liable on its
certification according to the tenor of the check at the time it
was drawn. The reasoning behind the majority rule is that the
drawee bank has contracted to pay the checks of the drawer ac-
cording to his order only. Consequently, a payment to one other
than the original payee does not constitute payment and, if the
check has been raised, any amount paid in excess of the original
amount can be recovered.5 In view of this conflict of authority
covering from forgers, thieves, or from those who have no title to the instrument."
See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 331, 337 (1931).
48. 1 PATON, DIGEST 808 et seq. (1940). For two Louisiana cases holding
the drawee guilty of negligent certification and permitting a holder in due course
to recover on the instrument as altered, see Godchaux v. Union National Bank,
28 La. Ann. 516 (1876), cited in Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1157, 1162 (1923); and
Helwege v. Hibernia National Bank, 28 La. Ann. 520 (1876). See Comment,
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on the
Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana - The Doctrine of Young v. Grote, 16
LOUISIANA LAW REviw 134 (1955).
49. See discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check,
13 N.C.L. REV. 450 et seq. (1935).
50. See note 16 supra.
51. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4
P.2d 781 (1931); National City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 800
II. 103, 132 N.E. 832, 22 A.L.R. 1153, 1157 (1921).
52. These courts contend that this is the literal and intended interpretation of
NIL § 62, which was designed to change the common law rule. See 1 PATON,
DIGEST 806-07 (1940). This reasoning was approved in Comment, Certifying
Altered Checks Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, 31 YALE L.J. 522 (1922) ;
Notes, 4 IL. L.Q. 202 (1921), 35 HFAv. L. REV. 749 (1922). It was disap-
proved in Notes, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 260 (1922), 6 MINN. L. REV. 405 (1922), 31
YALE L.J. 548 (1922).
53. Louisiana is now in accord with this majority rule. See Lawrence J. Kern,
Inc. v. Panos, 177 So. 432 (La. App. 1937), cited in Annot., 137 A.L.R. 874,
875 (1942). See also Annots., 121 A.L.R. 1056 (1939), 69 A.L.R. 1076 (1930),
26 A.L.R. 312 (1923), 22 A.L.R. 1157 (1923), 12 A.L.R. 1089 (1921). For a
general discussion, see 1 PATON, DIGEST 806 et seq. (1940), where a very good
argument is made for the majority position from the language of NIL §§ 124, 125,
and 132. NIL § 132 provides that "the acceptance of a bill is the signification
by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer." This has been interpreted
to mean that the measure of the acceptor's obligation is the original, rather than
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and the refusal of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to amend the NIL to conform to the majority rule,54 most banks
have undertaken to limit their liability on certification or else
refuse to certify at all. In most instances the conditional cer-
tification takes the form "payable as originally drawn" or some
similar phrase.5  Conditional certification is also used where the
drawee bank returns an instrument for proper endorsement.5 6
This is because decisions in several cases hold that the certifying
bank is liable on the instrument notwithstanding the lack of the
payee's endorsement. Those decisions have been based on the
theory that a new contract has been entered into by the certify-
ing bank.57
As a general rule, the drawee bank does not have to recognize
a stop payment order of the drawer. 5 In some jurisdictions,
however, a distinction is made between certification at the re-
quest of the drawer and certification at the request of the holder.
the altered, tenor of the instrument. NIL § 123 provides that a material altera-
tion without the assent of the parties avoids the instrument. NIL § 125 defines
material alteration, and this definition has been held, to include a change in the
payee's name. See Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana -Material
Alterations, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 105 (1955).
54. 2 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1071, op. 108(a) (1926).
55. Most banks have accepted the conditional certification form recommended
by the legal department of the American Bankers' Association, which is as follows:
CERTIFIED
Payable only as originally
drawn and when properly
indorsed
...................... D ate
.................... Bank
..................... Address
..................... Authorized signature.
See illustrations in Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should Know About ... Checks,
43 ILL. B.J. 168, 174 (1954) ; 1 PATON, DIGEST 800 et seq. (1940).
56. See discussion in Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should Know About . . .
Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168, 174-75 (1954) ; Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the
Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 454 (1935).
57. Meuer v. Phenix Nat. Bank, 94 App. Div. 331, 88 N.Y. Supp. 83 (1st
Dep't 1904). This would indicate that "the apparent holder upon obtaining cer-
tification could require payment regardless of title, as upon a new contract."
Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 455
(1935), discussing Freund v. Importers and Traders Nat. Bank, 76 N.Y. 352
(1879) and Lynch v. First Nat. Bank, 107 N.Y. 179, 13 N.E. 775 (1887). It
is pointed out, however, that no courts have ever gone that far. The drawee is
liable on its certification, however. Lipten v. Columbia Trust Co., 194 App. Div.
385, 185 N.Y. Supp. 198 (1st Dep't 1920). In the Lipten case the court found the
bank not liable to the holder of a check who held without endorsement, but this
was on the theory that the certification should be deemed conditional before its
presentation properly endorsed. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 992, 993 (1921).
58. Freund v. The Importers and Traders National Bank, 76 N.Y. 352 (1879)
is the initial authority for this proposition. See discussion in 1 PATON, DIGEST
823 et seq. (1940).
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In those jurisdictions, where certification has been procured by
the drawer the bank must recognize the stop payment order. It
does not have to do so where certification has been procured by
the holder.59 Where a stop payment order is recognized, the bank
will usually be permitted to avail itself of certain of the drawer's
defenses.6 0 In addition, the bank will usually require a bond of
indemnity from the party requesting that payment be stopped.61
As a result of this conflict in authority, however, many banks
refuse to stop payment of certified checks.
Most banks refuse to certify postdated checks, either because
it is prohibited or because it is considered a questionable bank-
ing practice.62 Where such certification is prohibited, stop pay-
ment orders, otherwise ineffective, have been permitted.6 3  A
distinction should be noted between certification of a postdated
check at the request of the drawer and that at the request of the
holder. Where done at the request of the holder, the bank has
been denied the right to charge the drawer's account.64 Where
done at the request of the drawer, however, it has been consid-
ered a valid transaction.6 5 But, in either instance, it has been
held that a transfer of a certified check to a holder before its
date is notice of a possible irregularity and deprives the holder
of the status of a holder in due course.66
59. See Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435, 35 A.L.R.
938, 942 (1924) ; Hamburger Bros. & Co. v. Third National Bank & Trust Co.,
333 Pa. 377, 5 A.2d 87 (1939) ; Roberts & Morris, The Effect of a Stop Payment
Order on a Certified Check, 5 Wyo. L.J. 170 (1951) ; STEFFEN, CASES ON COM-
MERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 495 (2d ed. 1954). See also Annots., 107 A.L.R.
1463 (1937), 94 A.L.R. 1391 (1935), 56 A.L.R. 532 (1928), 9 A.L.R. 1069
(1920).
60. See Times 'Square Automobile Co. v. Rutherford National Bank, 77 N.J.L.
649, 73 Atl. 479 (1909). See also discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print
for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 458 et seq. (1935). See also Green,
Real Defenses and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 9 TuL. L. REV. 78 (1934).
61. 1 PATON, DIGEST 824-25 (1940) ; see Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should
Know About . . . Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168; 176 (1954). The Louisiana court has
permitted stop payment of cashier's checks. See Nielsen v. Planters' Trust &
Savings Bank, 183 La. 645, 164 So. 613 (1935), reversing 161 So. 346 (La. App.
1935). It would seem the same rule would apply to certified checks.
62. For a general discussion on the subject of postdated checks, see Brecken-
ridge, The Negotiability of Postdated Checks, 38 YALE L.J. 1063 (1929). For
certification of postdated checks in particular, see Annot., 21 A.L.R. 234, 236(1922) ; 1 PATON, DIGEST 835-36 (1940) ; and discussion in Dahlin, What Every'
Lawyer Should Know About . . . Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168, 176 (1954).
63. See Annot., 35 A.L.R. 938, 942 (1925), citing Sutter v. Security Trust
Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924).
64. Dahlin, What Every Lawyer Should Know About . . . Checks, 43 IiL.
B.J. 168, 175-76 (1954).
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
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As a general rule, a bank may revoke its certification of a
check where such certification is made because of mistake. This
right is denied, however, when the rights of third persons have
intervened or their situation has been so changed -between the
time of the certification and the cancellation as to render it in-
equitable to permit revocation.67 This same rule applies where
certification has been procured by fraud.68 The cases indicate
that the courts are liberal in permitting banks to correct errors.0 9
According to the general view, the' payment of an overdraft by
a bank constitutes a loan to the depositor.70 The bank may re-
cover the amount of the overdraft from the depositor, even
though it has certified the check as good. The drawer of a check
who retains the certified instrument or who regains possession
of it may have the certification cancelled or the check re-deposit-
ed to his account. The bank in such case will usually seek to
determine whether the drawer is fraudulently in possession of
the instrument. In case of doubt, the bank may require a bond
or other form of indemnity or a statement from the payee that
he has no interest in the check.71 If the check has been lost, the
bank will require indemnity in almost every instance.72
Certification Under the Uniform Commercial Code
According to its draftsmen, the Uniform Commercial Code is
designed to promote uniformity in every phase of commercial
affairs.73 To this end, it was felt necessary that the NIL be sub-
jected to revision, to settle old disputes and to avoid conflict with
rules established for other phases of commerce. 74 In the field
of certification, numerous changes or additions have been sug-
gested over the years. 75 The draftsmen of the Code, however,
67. 1 PATON, DIGEST 839-40 (1940) ; see Annot., 29 A.L.R. 140 (1924).
68. Ibid.
69. See discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for Certified Checks, 13
N.C.L. REv. 450, 475, n. 136 (1935).
70. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 358, 360 (1921). For effect of overcertification in
general, see Annot., 2 A.L.R. 83, 90 (1919).
. 71. 1 PATON, DIGEST 840 et seq. (1940); see discussion in Dahlin, What
Every Lawyer Should Know About .. . Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168, 176 (1954).
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See UCC introductory comment to title, at p. 2, where the draftsmen say:
"The concept of the present Act is that 'commercial transactions' is a single sub-
ject of the law, notwithstanding its many facets .... This Act purports to deal
with all phases which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a commercial
transaction, from start to finish."
74. UCC 3-101, comment.
75. See, e.g., Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARt. L. REV. 241
(1900) ; Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law -A Word More, 14 HARM. L.
REV. 442 (1901) ; Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the
NIL - The Civil Law Analogy, 6 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1931) ; Beutel, The Proposed
Uniform Bank Collection Act and Possibility of Recodification of the Law on
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propose merely to reword and combine the two provisions of the
NIL and to add two new subsections as statements of current
practice. 76 Any changes in the law of certification are found in
other sections of the Code. The proposed Code provision on cer-
tification is as follows:
Section 3-411: "(1) Certification of a check is accep-
tance. Where a holder procures certification the drawer and
all prior indorsers are discharged.
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed; a bank has no obligation
to certify a check.
"(3) A bank may certify a check before returning it for
lack of proper indorsement. If it does so the drawer is dis-
charged."
Subsection (1) of UCC 3-411 combines and rewords NIL
sections 187 and 188. The first sentence of subsection (1) has
changed the wording of NIL section 187 from the statement that
"certification is equivalent to acceptance" to the more positive
statement that "certification is acceptance." (Emphasis added.)
It also eliminates the redundant portion of NIL section 187
which stated "by the bank on which it is drawn." Those words
were unnecessary, for certification can only be made by the bank
on which the check is drawn.77
Several writers have concluded that the statement "certifica-
tion is acceptance" would change the law by eliminating the dif-
ference in the drawer's liability where either the drawer or the
holder procures certification:78 Such is not the case under the
present draft of the Code, however, for the second sentence of
subsection (1) recognizes this distinction. 79 The more positive
Negotiable Instruments, 9 TUL. L. REV. 378 (1935) ; Hudson & Feller, The Inter-
national Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of Eechange, 44 HAiRv. L. REV. 333
(1931) ; Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV.
450 (1935) ; Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 25
(1928) ; Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 1047 (1929).
76. UCO 3-411, comment.
77. Particularly so in view of federal and state statutes making it a criminal
offense to certify a check against insufficient funds. See note 21 supra.
78. See A Symposium of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 17 ALBANY
L. REV. 1, 76-77 (1953) ; Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 255, 289-90 (1950).
79. See Andrews, Should Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code be
Adopted in Ohio?, 14 OHio ST. L.J. 32, 47-48 (1953) ; Ritz, Virginia Law and
the Commercial Paper Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1955) ; Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on Liability
19551
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
statement of the Code should serve more to clarify the law in
this respect than to change it.8° Considerable confusion is ap-
parent in the present law on certification as a result of this dis-
tinction and the unfortunate wording of NIL sections 187 and
188. As indicated previously, several courts have treated certifi-
cation of a check as a thing apart from acceptance. In the case
of the discharge of the drawer, other courts have called it the
equivalent of payment or the substitution of a new obligation.
As a remedy for this confusion and for similar misunderstand-
ings concerning the effect of an instrument on the obligation for
which it is given, the Code proposes an entirely new section.
UCC 3-802(1) (b) adopts the rule that a check or other nego-
tiable instrument represents only a conditional payment. This
means that the right to sue on the obligation is suspended until
the instrument is due and will be revived only if the instrument
of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MIcn. L. REv. 171, 194
(1954).
80. However, there are two changes in the language of NIL § 188 that may
cause difficulty. The first of these changes is with respect to the language of
NIL § 188 to the effect that when the holder of a check procures it to be "ac-
cepted or certified" the drawer and all endorsers are discharged. The second
sentence of subsection (1) of UCC 3-411 eliminates the word "accepted" and
retains the word "certification." No reason for this change is given. In view
of the fact that "certification is acceptance" under the Code, this change should
be without significance, but it could be interpreted to mean that where "ac-
ceptance" is procured the drawer remains liable. The argument was presented
under the NIL that although it was provided that certification is equivalent to
acceptance, it was not provided that acceptance was equivalent to certification.
See Beutel, 'The Proposed Uniform Bank Collection Act and Possibility of Be.
codification of the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 9 TUL. L. REV. 378, 389
(1935). It should be presumed, however, that the terms "acceptance" and "cer-
tification" are intended to be used interchangeably. But this same intention
was present when the NIL was drafted, and confusion still resulted. See Dahlia,
'What Every Lawyer Should Know About . . . Checks, 43 ILL. B.J. 168, 174
(1954), where a federal ruling requiring government agencies to accept only
certified checks with the word "certified" stamped on them and not those stamped
"accepted" is referred to. The draftsmen of the Code should properly explain
all changes to avoid confusion. For similar criticism see Beutel, Comparison of
the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 8, and the Negotiable Instruments Law,
30 NEB. L. REV. 531, 533-34 (1951).
The second change in language which may cause difficulty is with respect to
the language of NIL § 188 to the effect that where the holder procures certifica-
tion, the drawer and "all indorsers" are discharged. Subsection (1) of UCC
8-411 would change this provision to read "all prior indorsers" are discharged.
(Emphasis added.) Under the NIL provision the holder could have argued that
he, too, was an endorser and should be discharged. See the fact situation pre-
sented in Mutual National Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. Ann. 933 (1876), where the
holder who procured certification urged that the party accepting the check from
him had accepted the bank's obligation in lieu of his own. Although the drafts-
men of the Code fail to explain the change, the words "prior indorser" should
make it clear that the holder himself is not discharged. However, the draftsmen
have indicated that any endorsement made after certification remains effective.
See UCC 3-411, comment 1. They also state that if one desires to continue liable
on the instrument despite certification, the words "after certification' inscribed
by the endorsement will suffice to maintain liability. But this does not pertain
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is dishonored. Once dishonored, the right to sue is granted
either on the instrument or the obligation supporting it.81
UCC 3-802(1) (a), however, provides that the obligation is
not suspended but discharged where the obligation of a bank is
present, either as drawer, maker or acceptor, and there is no
recourse against the underlying obligor. A discharge on the in-
strument in this case is a discharge of the original obligation.
Such is the case where the holder procures certification.8 2 The
certified check in this instance is not a conditional obligation, but
is regarded as the equivalent of payment of the original obliga-
tion.8 This is in accord with jurisprudence under the NIL that
in such a case certification is the equivalent of payment. Since
the drawer is not discharged where he obtains the certification,
the certified check would continue as a conditional obligation.
This provision should settle any conflict as to the nature and
effect of a certified check. UCC 3-411 (1), when read in conjunc-
tion with UCC 3-802 (1) (b) and (c), seems to represent a much
better statement of the rule than NIL sections 187 and 188.84
There seems to be considerable merit, however, in the con-
tention advanced by some that the difference in result where
certification is procured either by the drawer or by the holder
should not be permitted to continue. 85 The reason for discharg-
to the party procuring the certification. Thus it would seem one could argue
that if the holder endorses prior to certification he could obtain his own release.
A word of explanation seems to be required in the Code in this regard.
81. UCO 3-802, comment 3.
82. Id. comment 2.
83. Ibid. Not treated here, but involving problems similar in effect and scope,
is the question of the right to attach or garnish the funds while in the hands of
the bank. See cases cited in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 592
et seq., 827 et seq., 1034 et seq., 1223 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel, 1948). See National
Commercial Bank v. Miller & Co., 77 Ala. 168 (1884), using the theory that
"certification is equivalent to payment" to permit garnishment. But see Causey
v. Eiland, 175 Ark. 929, 1 S.W.2d 1008, 56 A.L.R. 529 (1928) ; Parker v. Walsh,
200 Iowa 1086, 205 N.W. 853 (1925) ; University Supply Co. v. Hildreth, 287
Mass. 538, 192 N.E. 23 (1934) ; Standard Factors Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust
Co., 182 Misc. 701, 50 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Citizens' National Bank v.
First Nat. Bank, 66 Colo. 426, 182 Pac. 12 (1919). See also Annots., 94 A.L.R.
1389, 1391 (1935), 42 A.L.R. 622, 625 (1926), 5 A.L.R. 589 (1920). See NIL
§ 189 and compare with UCC 3-409.
84. UCC 3-802(1) (a), however, could be either better worded or explained.
As presently written it does not adequately express the thought that two things
must combine for there to be a complete discharge: (1) the obligation of the bank
as maker, drawer or acceptor; and (2) the discharge of the underlying obligor
on the instrument. The present wording, at first blush, would lead one to believe
that any time the bank assumes an obligation on an instrument all other parties
are discharged.
85. See discussion in Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check,
13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 476 et seq. (1935).
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ing the drawer where the holder procures certification grew out
of the many bank failures of the 1870's.86 The courts at that
time felt that it was only just to discharge the drawer rather
than have him bear the risk of bank failure when the holder
elected to procure certification rather than payment. It can be
argued that the drawer is not exposed to that danger today 7 and
that he should remain secondarily liable on the instrument in all
cases. It can be argued just as effectively, however, that the
drawer should be discharged regardless of who procured the cer-
tification, since the bank has charged the drawer's account and
assumed responsibility on the instrument.88 The draftsmen of
the Code, apparently, are not in favor of either change and mere-
ly prefer to revise the wording of the law to state it more clearly.
It is submitted that either of the suggested changes are worthy
of adoption. Adoption of the recommendation that the drawer
be held liable in all cases would be in complete accord with the
idea that certification is acceptance. Without the qualification
respecting discharge of the drawer when certification is pro-
cured by the holder, all possible confusion would be eliminated
as to the nature and effect of certification, for there would be no
doubt that it is to be treated as an acceptance in every instance.
Adoption of the recommendation that the drawer be discharged
in every instance would also have its advantages. Although it
would involve a complete change in the law of certification by
making it the equivalent of payment, it would inject simplicity
into the law and would give the public complete faith in such
instruments.8 9
Since certification is acceptance, any changes proposed in
the Code with respect to acceptance would also affect the law
on certification. One change to be noted which would affect two
practices under the NIL is the provision of UCC 3-410 (1) which
requires the acceptance to be written on the draft. 0 Under the
86. Id. at 467 et seq.
87. With current banking practices and laws being what they are and the
protection of the F.D.I.C. being extended to certified checks up to $10,000.
88. See Mutual National Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. Ann. 933 (1876), where this
same point was urged in a similar vein but rejected by the Louisiana court.
Acceptance of a certified check in this instance would constitute a novation. See
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2185 et 8eq. (1870). This would in effect uphold the reason-
ing of those courts that maintain that the bank has entered into a new contract.
Certification would then be the equivalent of payment, not acceptance.
89. This last approach has been strongly recommended. See Steffen & Starr,
A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV. 450, 477 (1935).
90. UCC 3-410(1): "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor
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NIL, acceptances may be written on the draft or on separate
paper.0 1 Promises to accept are also treated as acceptances
where there has been reliance on such promises.92 Under the re-
quirement that the acceptance be written on the draft, neither
of these practices could be treated as an acceptance.9 3 Certifica-
tion on a separate instrument would no longer be treated as an
acceptance and any rights arising through such practice would
be relegated to an action in tort or contract.94 Promises to accept
would not be treated as acceptances but would be governed by
provisions relating to letters of credit.95 Some writers have dis-
agreed with these provisions since they would abolish what they
consider to be common practices.96 The draftsmen of the Code,
on the other hand, contend that the need for "collateral" accep-
tance is no longer present and that good commercial and bank-
ing practice no longer sanctions acceptance by separate writing.9 7
Since those rights which are presently recognized are preserved
in the Code,98 no serious objection should be made to the change.
It serves the purpose of clarifying the concept of acceptance and
eliminating from that definition those practices which do not
exactly conform to its terms.
The draftsmen of the Code propose to put an end to the dis-
pute concerning the liability of the drawee bank on a check on
which the name of the payee has been changed or the amount of
the check has been raised prior to certification. NIL section 62
provides that the acceptor is liable "according to the tenor of his
acceptance." The majority of the courts have interpreted this
provision to mean the tenor of the instrument at the time it was
the draft as presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist of his
signature alone. It becomes operative when completed by delivery or notification."
91. NIL §§ 132-135.
92. NIL § 135.
93. UCC 3-410, comment 3. The Code provision is the same as section 17 of
the English Bills of Exchange Act, 1 & 2 Gao. IV, c. 78 (1821).
94. UCC 3-409(2) ; see UCC 3-410, comment 3.
95. UCC 5-101 et seq.
96. See Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and
the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REV. 531, 551 (1951) ; A Symposium
of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 17 ALBANY L. REV. 1, 76-77 (1953).
But see Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
48 Micu. L. REV. 255, 289-90 (1950), where the idea is expressed that the changed
provision would provide greater simplicity "without the loss of any needed legal
device."
97. See UCC 3-410, comment 3. For a reply to criticism see 1954 NEW YORK
STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 85, the report of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission on its study of the Code articles 3 and 4. See also the reply of the Sub-
committee for article 3 of the Editorial Board of the Uniform Code in Supple-
ment No. 1 to the UCC, at 117 (1955).
98. UCC 3-409(2); see UCC 3-410, comment 3.
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drawn. The Illinois and California courts, however, have applied
NIL section 62 literally and have held that it means the tenor of
the instrument at the time of acceptance or certification.9 9 When
asked to amend the language of NIL section 62 to conform to the
interpretation given by the majority, the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws refused to do so and indicated that the interpre-
tation given by the Illinois and California courts was correct. 1 0
As a result, conditional certification has become an almost uni-
form practice. The Code, however, adopts the minority view and
eliminates the practice of conditional certification.' 0 ' UCC
3-413 (1) provides that "the maker or acceptor engages that he
will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his
engagement." This language makes it clear that the liability of
the drawee bank is determined according to the form of the in-
strument at the time of the acceptance or certification, and not
at the time the instrument was drawn. UCC 3-417(1) (c) and
UCC 4-207 supplement UCC 3-413(1). Those sections, in list-
ing the warranties of a holder in due course and collecting bank
to a payer which has certified, omit any warranty against ma-
terial alteration prior to certification, even when the check has
been certified on the condition that it is "payable as originally
drawn" or in similar terms. Thus, one accepting an altered check
that has been accepted or certified would be protected, despite
conditional certification. The accepting or certifying bank would
be liable on the instrument as of the time of its acceptance or
certification and would not be permitted to contract away this
liability. The effect of these provisions would be to give the pub-
lic complete faith in accepted or certified checks and would pro-
vide absolute protection to the holder in due course of such in-
struments. In view of the fact that the vast majority of the
courts of this country have taken the opposite position, however,
acceptance of these provisions seems doubtful. 10 2
Concerning the remedy of the bank in the above situation,
the Code would provide some protection. The above cited pro-
visions are designed only to protect the holder in due course of
99. See note 51 8upra.
100. See note 54 supra.
101. See Brome, Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
308, 318-19 (1951); Sutherland, Article -Logic, Experience and Negotiable
Paper, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 230, 247.
102. In Louisiana, this would represent a return to the old "reliance on the
certification" theory expounded in early cases, notably Louisiana National Bank
v. Citizens Bank, 28 La. Ann. 1891, 26 Am. Rep. 92 (1876).
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an instrument that has already been accepted or certified. 0 3 The
bank's action against the person presenting the check for accep-
tance or certification would be retained. In addition, UCC 3-417
and UCC 4-207 provide that unless otherwise agreed, one obtain-
ing payment or acceptance or any prior transferor warrants to
the party who pays or accepts in good faith several things: that
he has good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain pay-
ment or acceptance, that he has no knowledge that the signature
of the maker is unauthorized, and that the instrument has not
been materially altered. 04 These provisions fully establish the
liability of the presenting party.
The effect of these provisions, however, would be doubtful in
at least one respect. Subsection (3) of UCC 3-411 is intended to
provide statutory recognition of the practice of drawee banks
certifying checks received by them for collection before return-
ing them for proper endorsement. 05 That subsection also recog-
nizes that where such checks are certified the drawer is dis-
charged. The purpose of such certification is to protect the
drawer against a longer contingent liability. 0 6 In some decisions
reached under the NIL, the certifying bank was deemed to re-
main liable on the certification whether proper endorsement was
subsequently obtained or not. 0 T The right of the certifying bank
to charge the drawer's account was then put in doubt. As a re-
sult, most banks resorted to conditional certification to make
their liability for certification dependent upon proper endorse-
103. See UCC 3-418 to the effect that "payment or acceptance of any instru-
ment is final in favor of a holder in due course." This section is intended to con-
tinue the doctrine of Price v. Neal. See id. comment, and UCC 3-417, comment 5.
104. Such warranties have long been proposed. See Steffen & Starr, A Blue
Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 479 et seq. (1935). It was
originally proposed that the one obtaining payment or acceptance or any prior
transferor also warrant that he has no knowledge of any effective stop payment
directive. See UCC 3-417(1) (b) in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT,
TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (1952). However, because of extensive criticism
and the possibility of more trouble than benefit, this warranty has been removed.
According to the draftsmen, the protection afforded payers by the warranty was
not necessary because of the provisions of UCC 4-407 which grant the payer
bank a right of subrogation on improper payment. But the deletion of the war-
ranty is not intended to affect the common law decisions on the question. See
SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS ON
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PART I, at 21 and 29, UCC 3-417 and 4-207
and reasons therefor (Jan. 1955). See, generally, Vergari, In re Articles 3, 41, and
5, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 529, 537 (1955).
105. UCC 3-410(2) authorizes this practice when it states: "A draft may
be accepted although it has not been signed by the drawer or is otherwise incom-
plete or is overdue or has been dishonored."
106. UCC 3-411, comment 3.
107. See note 57 supra.
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ment. 0 s In such case, if the drawer could validly question the
right of the bank to charge his account, the certifying bank could
deny liability on the instrument and recredit the drawer's ac-
count.10 9 Under the Code, however, the drawer would be dis-
charged and the bank would be liable on the instrument. 10 It is
not explained whether the authority to certify incomplete instru-
ments and to discharge the drawer upon such certification was
intended to prevent recourse by the drawer if the proper en-
dorsement could not be subsequently obtained. Apparently, con-
ditional certification would be to no avail."' It would also be
doubtful if the warranties of UCC 3-417(1) and UCC 4-207
would extend to this situation, for under the new contract theory
advanced in the cited decisions, the apparent holder of the in-
strument could obtain payment regardless of title." 2 Some clari-
fication is needed in the Code on this point.
Subsection (2) of UCC 3-411 merely incorporates the long-
recognized rule that in the absence of agreement a bank is under
no obligation to certify a check.1 3 The reason given by the
draftsmen of the Code for this rule is that a check is a demand
instrument calling for payment rather than acceptance." 4 The
Code recognizes that a bank may enter into agreements whereby
it undertakes to certify checks of the drawer. Liability for
breach of the agreement would not be on the instrument, how-
ever, but on the separate agreement. 15 It will be remembered
that a refusal to certify a check does not dishonor the instru-
ment;116 however, the reasoning for this rule has been ques-
tioned. 117 Under the rule proposed in the Code there must be a
re-presentment of the instrument for payment before it will be
108. See American Bankers' Association form, note 55 supra.
109. See UCC 4-401 for the right to charge the customer's account. That
section provides in subsection (2) that "a bank which in good faith makes pay-
ment to a holder may charge the indicated account of its customer according to
(a) the original tenor of his altered item; or (b) the tenor of his completed
item, even though the bank knew it was incomplete when delivered."
110. See UCC 3-802(1) (a).
111. UCC 3-413(1), 3-417(1) (c), 4-207. Of course, it is highly unlikely
that one taking an instrument containing an irregularity could be classified as a
holder in due course.
112. See note 57 supra.
113. See note 29 supra.
114. UCC 3-411, comment 2.
115. Ibid.; UCC 3409(1).
116. Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 826, 62 A.L.R. 674, 677(1928), is the leading case for this proposition.
117. Steffen & Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REV.
450, 461-62 (1935) ; Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amend-
menta to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 1047, 1060 et seq. (1929).
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considered dishonored. It is submitted that this is an unduly
technical procedure that is unwarranted in certain circum-
stances. Subsection (2) should be expanded to provide that a
refusal to certify will constitute dishonor of the instrument
unless it is against the general policy of the bank to certify
checks or to certify checks below a certain amount.118
The law of certification would be changed in yet another
respect by the adoption of the Code. Under the NIL, as a gen-
eral rule, the drawer remains liable where certification has been
obtained at his own request except to the extent that he has suf-
fered loss through unreasonable delay.1 9 It appears that this
rule has been applied only in cases involving the failure of the
drawee or payer. It is the opinion of the draftsmen of the Code
that this provision has not worked out satisfactorily because of
the difficulty encountered by the drawer in proving his loss. 20
UCC 3-502(1) (b) changes this rule by substituting a right to
assign to the holder the rights the drawer had against the drawee
or payer on the instrument. The assignment would give the
holder a claim against the drawee or payer. In view of the fact
that the drawer has seldom been able to prove his discharge, the
change may be desirable.
UCC 3-503 is the only provision of the Code concerning time
of presentment. Subsection (1) (b) recognizes the rule of NIL
section 186 that a check must be presented within a reasonable
time. Subsection (1) (e) provides that presentment must be
within a reasonable time after a secondary party becomes liable
on the instrument. UCC 3-503 (2) states that a reasonable time
is to be determined "by the nature of the instrument, any usage
of banking or trade and the facts of the particular case." Since
special provision is made concerning what is a reasonable time in
regard to uncertified checks, certified checks must be subject to
the broad rule of UCC 3-503 (2) .121 Under the Code, the running
of the statute of limitations would be suspended until the instru-
ment is due. 12 2 In effect, this is the same as the majority rule
under the NIL. 2 3 Although the NIL provides that a check must
118. These are the two reasons advanced for refusing to certify. See Turner,
A Factual Analysi8 of Certain Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 1047, 1060 et seq. (1929).
119. NIL § 186.
120. UCC 3-502, comment 2.
121. UCC 3-503(2).
122. UCC 3-802, comment 3.
123. See note 44 aupra.
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be presented within a reasonable time or the drawer will be dis-
charged to the extent of his loss through delay, many courts have
held that a certified check was not due until presented for pay-
ment.124 Under this rule, a certified check would be valid indefi-
nitely. Whether the Code would change this approach is diffi-
cult to determine since it adopts practically the same provision
as the NIL.
Another area of the law of certification that would be af-
fected by the Code is that of the right to stop payment. UCC
4-403 (1) specifically recognizes the right to stop payment, sub-
ject, however, to the provisions of UCC 4-303. This latter pro-
vision provides in subsection (1) that "any notice, stop-order or
legal process received and any valid setoff exercised by a payor
bank is entitled to priority over any item drawn on or payable
by and received by the bank until but not after the bank has
done any of the following: (a) accepted or certified the item
. " This section recognizes the liability of the bank on the
certified instrument and maintains the majority rule of the NIL
that the bank can refuse to recognize a stop payment order on a
certified check regardless of who procured the certification. 125
However, the rule appears to recognize the right of the drawee
to stop payment if it so desires. Since there are no Code pro-
visions to cover this event, it would seem that the rules developed
under the NIL would still apply. But if the certified check is to
be given the desired faith and trust of the public, stop payment
orders should not be permitted at all.
The Code would make no changes in the law of certification
on the subject of certification of postdated checks. UCC 3-114
simply states that the negotiability of an instrument is not im-
paired by the fact that it is postdated. This section does not
appear to alter the rule that negotiation of a postdated check may
constitute notice of a possible irregularity and deprive the holder
of the status of a holder in due course. 2 6 Although the draftsmen
of the Code state that UCC 3-114 is designed to remove uncer-
tainties arising under the NIL provisions,'127 no provision is made
to alleviate the confusion existing with respect to certification
124. See note 45 supra.
125. UCC 4-303, comments 1, 2; see note 58 supra.
126. UCC 3-114, comment 1: "Any fraud or illegality connected with the
date of an instrument does not affect its negotiability, but is merely a defense
under sections 3-306 and 3-307 to the same extent as any other fraud or illegality."
127. UCC 3-114, comment.
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of postdated checks. Thus, if the Code were adopted most banks
would probably continue their present policy of refusing to cer-
tify postdated checks, since no specific rule is presented in this
regard. Some provision should be made in the Code to cover
this subject, either by prohibiting certification of postdated
checks altogether or by establishing rules to guide those banks
which do certify postdated checks.
Conclusion
The difficulty encountered under the NIL of interpreting
provisions to apply to questions on certification is not remedied
in the Code. While there were two provisions in the NIL relat-
ing to this subject, the Code has reduced them to one provision
with two additions stating accepted principles. The result of the
arrangement under the NIL has been confusion and many con-
flicting decisions. It is not improbable that the same result
would obtain under the Code. Although it would be asking too
much to request that the rules on certification be codified separ-
ately, many special problems encountered in certification are
ignored under the proposed treatment. Most of these problems
arise because of the difference in treatment of situations where
certification is procured by the drawer and where it is procured
by the holder. Elimination of this distinction would place certifi-
cation on a sounder basis and would permit easier application of
other provisions of the law. It would eliminate the necessity of
formulating two separate sets of rules to be applied in particular
circumstances and would let it be known that certification is to
be treated in all cases either the same as an acceptance or as a
final payment. Although the Code would, clarify many areas
that are in doubt under the NIL, it has ignored this opportunity
for improvement.
Charles M. Lanier
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